Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Dialethism: dialethism is a paraconsistent logic that goes back to G. Priest (G. Priest, What is so Bad about Contradictions? Journal of Philosophy, 95, pp. 410-26). It is about the fact that contradictory statements can be asserted at the same time. See also paraconsistent logic, truth agglomerations, truth gaps, paradoxes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Logic Texts on Dialetheism - Dictionary of Arguments
Sainsbury V 203 Statement/Sentence/Sainsbury: Thesis: to say something is an action. If it is true, it expresses a mental state of acceptance. Likewise, denial is an action. Three dualities: true/false testify/deny accept/reject. Contradiction/accept/Priest: there are two possibilities if you do not accept [the statement] A. a) reject the statement, refuse to accept it b) be agnostic about A, neither accepting nor refusing to accept. V 204 Truth/Priest: Thesis: Truth and falsehood are not mutually exclusive. A proposition can be both true and false at any given time. Question: can a) and b) be represented at the same time? problem: F What is false should be rejected. Now all contradictions should be rejected. F demands modification. It is not reasonable to reject what is de facto wrong when all available evidence indicates that it is true. (e.g. until later scientific discoveries). Truth/Priest: is inextricably linked with falsehood. One cannot accept all truths and reject all falsehoods. V 205 What one should do is to reject all falsehoods that are not also truths. This is a rule of conduct that anti-dialethists cannot argue about, it comes down to F. Priest: most of us eventually believe contradictions. This seems to lead to difficulties: If we accept from A, A and also do not accept A, then we could not truly testify A. So we could truly deny A. So we reject A. So there is a proposition that we both accept and reject. PriestVs: this train of thought does not allow that from the premise that A should not be accepted, it can be concluded that A must be rejected. Sainsbury: it is impossible to be in a state of acceptance and rejection at the same time. But that obviously does not forbid that reason demands that a proposition be both accepted and rejected at the same time. "Should" does not imply "could". Solution: Dialethism/Sainsbury: the idea is that when we come to a dialethia, we can accept it and therefore do not have to criticize the train of thought that led to it. Cf. >Bivalence, >Dialethism/Priest, >Contradiction._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Logic Texts
> Counter arguments in relation to Dialetheism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29